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Abstract 
This paper analyzes appropriate procedures for studying how the credit rationing 
process takes place in rural financial markets. The paper demonstrates that in order 
to analyze credit discrimination one should have a well-defined demand and supply 
model. This model should be estimated using data on both loans granted and loans 
rejected. The criteria by which credit applications were rejected or accepted should 
also be explicitly incorporated into the analysis. 
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Introduction 
Non-price rationing in credit markets, as a substantive issue of theory and 
policy, is a subject of primary importanc-e, and considerable controversy. Credit 
rationing was discussed in the earlier er__onomic literature as a situation where the 
demand for loans exceeds their supply at the quoted loan rate of interest. 
Conventional economic theory has traditionally viewed market clearing and market 
equilibrium as one and the same. Consequently, a situation where supply does not 
equal demand has been perceived of as a disequilibrium state which could persist 
only if forced by the economy through external factors such as price regulation. 
However, it is widely known that lenders will not grant arbitrarily large loans even 
with high loan rates. Also it is known that borrowers with known differences in 
relevant characteristics get different loan contracts. This point has been recognized 
by more recent economic literature. This literature has attempted to explain the 
rationality of lender behavior of setting a price where loan demand exceeds supply 
by considering "legal" and "social" constraints, high screening costs, and most 
convincingly by assymetry of information in credit markets (for details, see 
Hodgman [1960], Jaffee and Modigliani [1969], Jaffee and Russell [1976], Azzi and 
Cox [1976], Baltensperger [1978], Keeton [1979], Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Devinney 
[1986], and Bester [1987]). 
This more recent literature, however, has not explained how the credit 
rationing process takes place, or has simply assumed that the discriminatory process 
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is carried out by random rejection. However, this is clearly unrealistic. The 
available empirical evidence suggests that most rural credit programs implemented 
in low income countries have invariably favored the largest and most influential 
producers, thus worsening the rural income distribution [Gonzalez-Vega, 1984b]. 
Recently, the rural financial markets literature has identified cheap-credit policies 
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and high operational costs per unit of money loaned as some of the most important 
factors causing the disappointing results observed in rural credit programs.1 It has 
been argued that cheap-credit policies tend to create excess demand thereby forcing 
agricultural lenders to ration credit through non-price mechanisms. Since 
operational lending costs and associated risks in servicing large rural producers are 
lower than those associated with small producers, the agricultural lender is 
motivated to favor the largest farmers in order to reduce per unit lending costs 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1984a, Ladman, 1984 ). 
The main objective of this study is two-fold. First, we discuss appropriate 
procedures for analyzing discriminatory credit rationing in rural credit markets. 
Second, we analyze if there was any discriminatory credit rationing in lending 
activities of a Portuguese agricultural lending program (the Fundo de 
Melhoramento Agricola) operating through the Ministry of Agriculture during the 
1974-1979 period. This program reflects the classic supply-leading financial strategy 
of directing credit to agricultural producers with concessional rates of interest. 
1 For an extensive analysis of the impact of cheap-credit policies on rural credit 
markets cfr. Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke L1984]. 
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Traditionally, empirical studies have established discrimination against some 
class(es) of borrowers (or regions, etc) by checking whether the dummy variable for 
a selected class of borrowers is statistically significant in a discriminant, probit, or 
logit function. However, these are not the appropriate procedures. Discriminant, 
probit, or logit models are of reduced (single equation) form variety. Hence, it is not 
possible to determine whether the dummy variable for some class of borrowers is 
statistically significant because of the demand or the supply function. This can be 
better explained through an example. Let's us assume that we attempt to determine 
if the class of borrowers denoted as IND has been discriminated against in a typical 
rural credit program by checking the sign and statistic significance of the dummy 
variable IND in a probit model. Let's assume that the coefficient obtained for this 
class of borrowers in the probit model is negative and statistically significant. Hence, 
the probit analysis concludes that IND borrowers have been discriminated against in 
the credit market. Now, let's assume that we also attempt to analyze if these class of 
borrowers CIND) has been discrimanled against by estimating the following 
simultaneous equation model: 
LOAN DEMAND: (1) 
LOAN SUPPLY: 
where IND is the dummy variable corresponding to the class of borrowers under 
study; r is loan rate of interest; X1 and X2 are vectors of explanatory variables; 
as and {3 s are parameters; and fJ- 1 and p..2 are disturbance errors. Assume that, after 
solving the model specified above by appropriate methods, a 1 is negative and 
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statistically significant in the demand function, but {3 1 is not statistically different 
from zero i.e., the class of borrowers IND demand less than other classes, but in 
terms of granted loans they are not different from other groups. In other words, the 
class of borrowers IND are not experiencing discrimination in the market. This 
result contradicts that obtained in the probit model. Consequently, in order to 
analyze discriminatory credit rationing in rural credit markets one has to have a 
well defined loan demand and loan supply model. 
The Model 
The model considered in this study draws on that of Nelson [1977] for labor 
markets, and Maddala and Trost [1982] for loan markets. The model can be 
represented as follows: 
(2) 
(3) 
where i=l, .... ,n (applica,nts); L~ is the initial loan request from the ith applicant; L~ is 
the maximum amount that the lender is willing to offer to the ith applicant; Xi is a 
K-element vector of observable exogenous and regulatory variables; and fJ- 1 and fJ- 2 
are random disturbances that follow a bivariate binormal distribution wit zero mean 
vector and unknown variances and co variances, a 1, a 2, and a 12• Both disturbances 
are assumed to be independent of Xi. 
Since the simultaneous equation model's objective is to study how the 
discriminatory credit rationing process takes place in rural credit markets, it is 
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necessary to consider the criterion by which the lender decides to grant or reject a 
loan. Following Nelson [1977] and Maddala [1984], let's assume the following 
accept-reject criterion: 
L= I I I jL0 , if L0 ~L8 (The loan is granted) 
i 0, if L0 > L8 (The loan is rejected) 
(4) 
I I 
where Li is the observed loan amount. This criterion function defines two sets of 
observations: n0, the subset of rejected loans; and the subset nl' the subset of granted 
loans. Since the system of equations (2) and (3) is a simultaneous equations model 
with censoring,2 an identification problem arises. Given the fact that the model is 
similar to that of Nelson [1977], the necessary condition for identification of the 
model requires one restriction among the set {3 2, a 2, a 12• For example, if some 
element of {3 2 is restricted to be zero, the necessary condition is satisfied, even in the 
case that the corresponding element in {3 1 is non-zero. Likewise, restricting a 12 to be 
zero is sufficient for identification. 
The more appropriate estimation procedure of the model is the Maximum 
Likelihood technique. Following Nelson [ 1977] the model may be estimated as 
follows: Since, the data on the amount a loan applicant requests is usually available, 
and assuming that the necessary condition for identification are satisfied, then the 
demand function may be estimated by OLS. The supply function (3), in turn, may 
be estimated with a simple probit model with known threshold. From criterion 
function (4) we know that whenever L8~L0 the loan is granted. Hence, by 
replacing equation (3) for L~ we get 13'2X2+cx2r+,u2 ~L0• If L8 <L0 , the loan is 
2 Notice that in this case L~ is never observed. 
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denied. Thus, the likelihood function for the supply function may be written as 
Ilo. nn . D (3 X+a r-L 1 (3 X+a r-L 
L(f3 ,a- ,X)=IJct>C 2 2 )IJ[t-ct>( 2 2 )] 
2 2 (J" (J" 
(5) 
2 2 
where the first product is over all observations for denied loans, and the second is 
for all observations for granted loans; and ci> is the unit normal distribution function. 
The estimates of 0:' 1 and 0:'2 will measure the effects of changing loan rate of 
interest on loan demand and supply, respectively. The estimated coefficient for {3 2 
will help to answer the question of whether or not the lender discriminates against 
certain sectorCs) of the rural borrowing population, and/or the impact of differing 
regulatory measures on lender's acceptance rate. 
The Data 
The data for this study consist of 6516 loan applications during 1974-1979 
from the Fundo de Melhoramento Agricola statistics. The period 1974-1979 was 
chosen to investigate the impact on the loan portfolio of the economic and political 
changes that occurred in Portugal after the April 1974 Revolution. The data 
terminates in 1979 the last year that the program operated. Table 1 presents the 
definition of the variables used in this study. 
Table 1: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THIS STUDY 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Interest rate on loan 
Loan request size in cantos (basis 1976). 
INT 
RINV 
TYPE 
IND 
COP 
OF BORROWERS ......................... . 
Dummy = 1 if individual 
Dummy = 1 if cooperative 
COLLATERAL ............................... . 
MORT 
TYPE OF 
TERR 
FRU 
LIVEST 
WATER 
CUL 
Mortgage 
INVESTMENT ........................ . 
Dummy 1 if soil preparation 
Dummy 1 if fruits 
Dummy 1 if livestock 
Dummy 1 if irrigation and drainage. 
Dummy 1 if horticulture and forest. 
REGION ................................... . 
NORTH 
SOUTH 
CEN 
TIME DELAY 
DELOK 
DELAUT 
The Results 
Dummy = 1 if north 
Dummy = 1 if south 
Dummy = 1 if center. 
IN LOAN ACTIVITY .............. . 
Number of months to approve a loan. 
Number of months to disburse a loan. 
The estimated demand and supply model is the following: 
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(6) 
Supply: L* ={30 +a}NT+{3 1RINV +{3 2IND+{3 3COP+{3 4 MORT+{35 TERR+f3lRU 
+{3 8 WATER+{3qCUL{3 10NORTH+{3 11SOUTH+{3 12CEN+,u2 (7) 
where L* is the dummy variable defined as follows 
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L* {= 1, if the loan is granted 
= 0 otherwise 
The variables are defined in Table 1. The results of the demand and supply model 
with exogenous interest rates are set forth in Table 2. The supply equation was 
estimated by probit model. The demand equation, in turn, was estimated by 
ordinary least squares. 
The Supply Results. The interest rate coefficient ONT) shows a highly 
significant sign (t-ratio 18.57 ) as expected, i.e., the probability that the lender grants 
a loan increases with higher nominal interest rates. The negative and significant 
sign of RINV Ct-ratio 2.12) indicates that the size of the loan demanded negatively 
influences the lender's willingness to grant a loan. This result can be interpreted as 
loan-size rationing. Mortgage collateral is apparently not considered by the lender 
as an incentive mechanism to sort borrowers of different risk, as proposed by Bester 
[1987] ; the sign is positive, but insignificant (t-ratio 0.49). Individual CIND) and 
cooperative (COP) borrowers were not discriminated against in the credit allocation 
process by the lender. The signs of both estimators are positive and significant at a 
one percent level (t-ratio are 5.42 and 6.89, respectively). The results obtained for 
type of investment show that the fruit sector was discriminated against during this 
period; in fact, the sign of FRUIT is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. 
Ct-ratio -3.24). Other activities were favored by the program. The sign of TERR, 
LIVEST, WATER ,and CUL are positive and significant, especially the sign of CUL 
(t-ratio 7.77). 
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· The results obtained for the dummy variables for regions indicates that the 
program has rationed credit away from applicants in Southern Portugal. In fact, the 
SOUTH shows a negative and significant sign, at the 5 percent level (t-ratio -2.50). 
Applicants from the North, on the other hand, appear to have been favored with 
lending activities from the Fundo de Melhoramento Agricola. The NORTH presents 
a mildly significant sign Clogit t-ratio 1.90); significant at a 10 percent level. 
Applicants from the center appear to be neither favored nor rationed by the lender. 
CEN estimator shows a positive but insignificant sign (t-ratio 0.18). 
The Demand Results. The demand equation estimators show interesting 
results. The interest rate coefficient is negative as expected but insignificant (t-ratio 
-0.19). This may be explained by the low rates of interest charged by this 
agricultural lending program. The cheap-credit policies and the lender's inability to 
establish an interest rate that would clear the market imposes implicit costs on 
borrowers. It is interesting to note that when we consider a proxy variable for 
borrower transaction costs, such as time delay (DELAUT) in the credit disbursement 
process, we have a negative and significant sign (t-ratio -2.28). This implies that the 
longer the delay in the credit disbursement, the lower is loan demand. Another 
interesting aspect that we can observe in loan demand is that the loan size demanded 
by cooperatives is significantly larger than the loans demanded by individuals. COP 
presents a positive and significant sign (t-ratio 9.58, significant at 1 percent). IND, in 
turn, shows a negative and insignificant sign Ct-ratio -0.18). Finally, it is interesting 
to note that the average loan amount demanded by individuals from the South was 
smaller than the average size of loans demanded by borrowers from the North of 
10 
the country. SOUTH presents a significant negative sign Ct-ratio -7.64, significant at 
1 percent level). NORTH shows a positive sign, significant at 5 percent level. 
Table 2: ESTIMATES OF LOAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODEL 
VARIABLE 
INT 
RINV 
IND 
COP 
MORT 
TERR 
FRU 
LIVEST 
WATER 
CUL 
NORTH 
SOUTH 
CEN 
DELOK 
DELAUT 
CONSTANT 
SUPPLY(PROBIT) 
0.029 ( 18.57) 
-0.016 (- 2.12) 
0.445 ( 5.42) 
0.551 ( 6.89) 
0.022 ( 0.49) 
0.367 ( 4.14) 
-0.380 (- 3.24) 
0.299 ( 3.35) 
0.297 ( 3.62) 
0.765 ( 7.77) 
0.116 ( 1.90) 
-0.092 (- 2.50) 
0.011 ( 0.18) 
-1.601 (- 2.63) 
DEMAND (OLS) 
-0.01 (-0.19) 
-0.02 (-0.18) 
1.03 ( 9.58) 
0.350 ( 3.81) 
-0.530 (-7.64) 
-0.042 (-0.40) 
0.001 ( 0.29) 
-0.002 (-2.28) 
0. 022 ( 1. 79) 
RSQ = .239 
D-W = 1. 466 
~otal number of observations = 6516 
Number of Loan Applicants Rejected = 2413. 
Number of Loan Applicants Accepted = 4103. 
RSQ = R-square between observed and predicted. 
D-W = Durbin-Watson 
Figures in parentheses are asymptotic t-ratios 
for the supply function and exact t-ratios for 
the demand function. 
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Conclusions 
The present paper argued that in order to analyze the credit rationing process 
in rural financial markets, one should have a well-defined demand and supply 
model estimated by using data on both loans granted and loans rejected. The role of 
existing constraints, like interest rate ceilings, and the criteria by which loan 
applications were accepted or rejected should also be explicitly incorporated into the 
analysis. 
The paper illustrates the loan demand and loan supply model with non-
negotiable loan contracts using loan information provided by a Portuguese 
agricultural development program, the Fundo de Melhoramento Agricola during the 
period 1974-1979. The results show a clear discrimination against applicants from 
the South of the country. Orchard enterprises (fruits) appears to be the agricultural 
activity experiencing the most discrimination against during this period. The 
coefficient obtained for the loan size variable (RINV) shows that the lender has 
oriented its lending activity mainly lo aclivilies requiring small loan size. The 
coefficients obtained for the loan demand show that those demanding small loans, in 
turn, has been subject to higher transaction costs, as represented by the time delay in 
credit approval. 
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